Abstract-Cyber-physical security is a major concern for the new generation of trains. In fact, trains are increasingly relying on automation, control and communication technologies in order to improve the efficiency and safety of their services as well as the comfort of passengers. This dependency introduces certainly new vulnerabilities and entry points to the system which exposes the system to new threat scenarios. This paper deals with cyber-physical security aspects of Train Control and Monitoring Systems (TCMSs). We analyse vulnerabilities and characteristics of railway threat landscape including potential threats, threats agents and motivations. We discuss, also, direct impacts and cascading consequences on the whole system as well as the risk generated.
I. Introduction
Technological advances and ongoing digitalization are continuously improving safety and efficiency of railways systems. New generation of trains will use real-time rail information and on-line environmental data in combination with on-board references to achieve optimal control of the train traction and braking while keeping with travel schedule and reducing energy consumption. Train passengers travelling experience will be improved as well through services such as connected infotainment, realtime information, etc. These innovations are accomplished using networked devices along with advanced remote access and control capabilities. Introducing such features for safety critical systems like railway systems brings not only improvements but also new challenges concerning cyber-physical security.
Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly automated and sophisticated. Their impact on critical infrastructures, in particular railway systems, can lead to catastrophic consequences, no matter whether they are the intended target or not. Attacks on operational systems could lead to the disruption or the unavailability of the rail transport itself. When informational systems are attacked it can lead to the unavailability of services for the passenger, like being unable to buy a ticket or digitally check a ticket into the system. Consequently, cyber-attacks on the transportation sector create a large impact on society and people's daily life varying from direct effects like delays, accidents, injuries or even deaths, to indirect effects, like social-economic effects.
The work presented in this paper is conducted within the European project Roll Rail under the task "security for TCMS", that aims to identify convenient security countermeasures and to define required protection levels for each TCMS asset. Yet, such outcomes can be accomplished using a coherent and strategic approach that encompasses all cyber-physical security aspects. The starting point of the selected approach is studying the system vulnerabilities and the threat landscape. As such, in this paper, we present security threats and vulnerabilities assessments of TCMS with the aim of identifying threats, quantifying impacts and expected losses, and analyzing criticality of the system assets. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II shortly introduces the System under Consideration (SuC) . We analyze the system vulnerabilities in section III. Then, we discuss railway threat landscape through a threat model, actors and motivation analysis in section IV, and present potential impacts and risks on railway systems in section V. A detailed threat analysis of some assets of the SuC is presented in section VI. Finally, the paper is concluded, in section VII.
II. System Identification
The starting point of a cyber-physical security analysis is performing a clear identification of the SuC. This step consists in illustrating the SuC assets and Industrial Automation Control Systems (IACSs) included in the system, identifying the access points to it and defining the security perimeters. Thus, in this section, we detail the proposed architecture of the SuC which is the TCMS, as well as its different functionalities. This step helps to identify the sensitive assets of the SuC. The TCMS is mainly responsible for providing basic train control functions such as: -train network inauguration, -train topology determination and configuration, -providing orientation information for coupled elements, -leading vehicle information management, -train network operation and access management, and -data transmission. Nevertheless, with the recent advances of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) integrated in the railway industry, a TCMS is expected to manage a set of sophisticated applications not only for a more reliable train control, but also for operator oriented services and customer comfort purposes. As such, in order to separate the control system ICT from the comfort ICT, the SuC is clustered into functional
Figure : SuC functional domains based model [ ] The • TCMS domain includes both safety related and non-safety related TCMS functions. The functions of this domain, which are mandatory to ensure safe train movement and to carry the payload, are : main control, train radio, air conditioning, propulsion, brakes, electricity, lavatories, lighting, supporting systems, passenger announcement system, external doors and internal doors, European Train Control System (ETCS), Automatic Train Protection (ATP), On-board Driving Data Recording System (ODDRS), passenger alarm system and Closed-circuit television (CCTV) for rear view purposes.
• Operator Oriented Services (OOS) are auxiliary services for proper train operations. Funtions of OOS domain are: priority logic, CCTV for video surveillance purposes, infotainment in train embedded devices, mobile phone amplifiers, automatic passenger counting,vehicle positioning, fare management or ticketing, driver assistance system, Eschedule, diagnostics and Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) systems and Passenger Information System (PIS) (including automatic announcements).
• Customer Oriented Services (COS) include the functions executed by passenger devices such as: access for the passenger's devices (e.g. Wi-Fi access points), Access to the public internet and passenger info-portal. This three-level modelling, presented in Figure , aims to increase flexibility, scalability, and adaptability of the system for future evolutions. To accomplish all functionalities mentioned above, system actors and devices need to exchange data and commands using communication networks in different communication schemes such as intra-train, train-to-train and train-to-ground communications. Communication networks for future railway systems are expected to be heterogeneous composed of a mixture of several networks and radio access technologies that can be simultaneously accessed by different system actors and devices in order to improve the capacity of communications. For instance, the Roll Rail project proposes the use of an heterogeneous network architecture combining wireless technologies, such cellular network like LTE, IEEE . , RFID and wired networks. The advantages and specificities of each of these technologies is taken into consideration [ ]. For safety and security purposes, access between different domains will be limited. Indeed, as shown in Figure , the proposed architecture includes also network protection devices between different functional domains since their security and safety requirements differ.
III. Vulnerability Assessment
The integration of cyber-physical systems into critical infrastructures brings not only benefits but also a new set of vulnerabilities for the whole system. The exploitation of such cyber-vulnerabilities can lead to physical consequences. The vulnerabilities of railway systems can be divided in two categories [ ]: general cyber-vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities coming from the specificity of railway systems. 1− General vulnerabilities for IACS • Wireless and cellular communications. Although such communication technologies bring several advantages to the system, they introduce typical vulnerabilities because communications take place 'through the air' using radio frequencies and thus it is difficult to prevent physical access to them, especially in open and accessible areas like public railway infrastructures. The risk of attacks such as interception and intrusion is greater than with wired networks.
• Increasing system automation. Although automation control improves safety and global system operations by removing the possibility of human error, it introduces new vulnerabilities since the surface of attack increases and therefore the risk of attack is higher. 2− Specific vulnerabilities for the railway field • Scale and complexity of railway systems. Railway infrastructure is a large-scale international infrastructure. Applying networked technologies across large railway systems increases the number of access points to the system.Thereby, securing communications and connectivity between mobile devices on a large area is a complicated task.
• Cohabitation between legacy and new systems. Since railway infrastructure is a shared common infrastructure used by different railway companies, the use of legacy equipment and infrastructures introduces new vulnerabilities.
• Multiple independent systems. In addition to legacy problems, railway systems are composed of diverse systems such as sensors, computers, payment systems, emergency systems,etc. It is crucial, but also difficult, to ensure smooth interfacing and secure communication between such independent and heterogeneous systems. This increases system vulnerabilities.
• Access to real-time data. Reliable operation of the system requires a non-stop real-time data exchange which may result in costly maintenance and periods of service downtime.
• Online passenger services such as timetabling, passenger information, ticket booking, are also susceptible to cyber attacks.
IV. Railway Threat Landscape
A threat landscape provides an overview of potential threats against the SuC and their characteristics. In this view, we are identifying the set of threats against a railway system, threat actors and their motivation to attack.
A. Potential threats against TCMS
A railway system is exposed to many types of attacks of different nature. In this section, we present a threat taxonomy that covers mainly cyber-security threats; which are threats directly applied to ICT assets and thus affecting SuC operations. We also present non-IT threats to cover threats to SuC physical assets that are necessary for the system operation. Based on recent studies published by European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [ ] [ ] [ ], threats can be classified as follows:
• Physical attacks. This type of threat is caused by intentional offensive actions aiming to achieve maximum distraction, disruption, destruction, exposure, alteration, theft or unauthorized accessing of assets such as infrastructure, hardware or ICT connections.
• Accidental damages. These are caused by unintentional insider actions [ ] including human errors [ ]. Unintentional mistakes can be made by authorized employees, users, developers, and testers during data entry, operations, or system or application development. Such errors can affect system integrity and stability.
• Malicious activities. This type of threats contains cyber-attacks and intentional nefarious activities or abuse targeting railway system assets through digital assets.
B. Threat actors and motivations
Railway systems can be threatened by several types of actors with different motivations. In the following, we present a taxonomy of threat actors against railway systems by order of importance:
• Nation states. This is an emerging, yet critical, class of threat actor against critical infrastructures, including railway systems. In fact, these systems are the the backbone of a nation's economy, security, and health. As such, they become significant targets in modern cyber-warfare. Attacks performed by such actors can be politically or economically motivated.
• Non-state organized threat groups. This category includes mainly cyber-terrorists but also cyber-fighters and cyber-criminals. All these threat actors can be organized on local, national or international levels. However, their motivations and skill level vary. Cyber-terrorists have political or religious motivations and their aim is to cause a physical harm to the system.Whereas, cyberfighters are patriotic motivated groups of citizens with strong feelings when their political, national or religious values seem to be threatened by another group and are capable of launching cyber-attacks to protest. Cybercriminals are organized groups with quite high skill levels that attack systems for financial gain.
• Insider threat agents including employees (staff, contractors, operational staff) and third party (vendors, system integrators, and other third party service and product providers) are considered as dangerous threat actors since they have insider access to private facilities and resources. They have a significant amount of knowledge that allows them to place effective attacks against sensitive parts of the system.
• Hacktivists are attackers, in many cases with limited technical skills, but rely on ready-to-use attack kits and services, or even third-party botnets, to cause damage to a system e.g., denial of service, defacement as a means of protest. Their protests are often politically motivated.
• Business-oriented attackers is a traditional category of attackers that are interested in performing abusive activities against competitor-controlled cyber-physical systems in order to cause concrete damage and gain business advantages.
• Casual cyber-attackers that usually have little or no technical skills. They are able to launch attacks against connected control systems and cause serious damage, more critical than in the case of simple IT systems. It is important to note that individual non state attackers (such as hacktivists, business-oriented attackers and casual attackers) could also be considered by nation states as allies in a low intensity warfare against an opponent nation.
The aforementioned actors are driven by several categories of motivations. We identify two main motivations:
• Political purposes. Since railway systems are part of a nation critical infrastructure, attacking them is considered as a strategical warfare weapon that may cause severe consequences varying from endangering people lives to financial loss and economical impacts. As these systems become increasingly reliant on ICT, they merge as a important target for political motivated cyber attacks. These warefare strategies are already used and they have been multiplied in the few past years. They can be used to cause physical damage or exfiltrating intelligence or secret information. Some well-publicized example is the attack conducted on Iranian Nuclear Facilities by using the worm Stuxnet [ ]. According to [ ], Stuxnet was launched by the US and Israel several years ago, in an attempt to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. Actors such as nation states and hacktivists fall in this category.
• Financial purposes. Transportation systems, including railway systems, are the backbone of national economies, providing connections for people and goods, access to jobs and services, and enabling trade and economic growth. Attacking such systems results in financial loss to the service providers, but also other cascading consequences on other domains. At railway operator level, attacks can be financially motivated in order to cause business disruption and sales loss. This can cause significant long-term economic impacts when the operators' reputation and the customers are impacted [ ]. Financial motivated attacks are usually performed by business-oriented actors, but also by nation states actors driven by economic reasons. This category of motivations also existed before critical infrastructures became an appealing and sensitive target.
V. Risk on railway systems
A risk is defined as the potential that a given threat will successfully exploit vulnerabilities and thereby produce a negative impact on the system. From operator perspective, the most important aspect is the train movement, for that, security concern is first integrity, then availability and finally confidentiality. In fact, loss of integrity could lead to accidents or collisions, whereas loss of availability would bring the railway system to a halt. Loss of confidentiality is less than an immediate threat, but might result in the leak of sensitive operational information. From the passenger perspective, negative impacts can be confidentiality and privacy problems (since the system uses sensing, tracking, real-time behaviour evaluation and automated decisions), interruption and disturbance of transport services resulting in disruption of their daily lives, etc. However, the most critical impact is when passengers health and safety are affected. Indeed, passengers safety is the priority to all railway systems actors, nonetheless, some incidents may endanger health and safety, not to mention threats coming from terrorism that need to be accounted for when protecting railway systems and infrastructure. The aforementioned impacts can affect one or many areas. We distinguish categories of risk based on the impacted area [ ]. For each area, we define levels of severity.
• Safety : Risks impacting safety differ in terms of severity. In fact, a risk can result in (level ) light and moderate injuries and/or minor damage to the environment, (level ) severe injuries and/or large damage to the environment and even (level ) life-threatening and fatal injuries and/or extreme damage to the environment.
• Financial : Financial impacts vary from: -undesirable financial damage and impact on the public image of the company(level ), -substantial financial damage and a serious impact on the public image of the company(level ), to -existence-threatening financial damage and severe impact to the public image of the company such as the incident may incur people suing the company(level ).
• Operational : Impacts on operational aspects may affect comfort functionalities, however the vehicle can be used but with some restrictions(level ). It can also lead to affect an important functionality but the train still can be used, only with massive restrictions(level ). In the worst cases, one or more fundamental functions may be affected such as the train becomes unusable(level ).
VI. Threat analysis
In this section, we present a detailed threat analysis for TCMS. We describe potential threats, the direct impacts on the attacked asset, the cascading consequences on the whole system, the impacted area (marked I.A)(S, F or O for safety, financial, operational respectively) and the risk level ( , or as defined in paragraph V).In our original work, we performed the analysis for all system assets. In this paper, due to space limitation, we selected two assets of a railway system with different functionalities and levels of criticality: propulsion system from the TCMS domain and CCTV surveillance system from the OOS domain. Table I presents a threat analysis of the propulsion system responsible for the movement of a train. The analysis shows that threats on the propulsion system (and this is also true for all TCMS domain functions) target mainly the availability (blocking , disconnection, destruction, etc) and integrity (changing configuration, erroneous administration, etc) of the system. Such actions may result in catastrophic consequences on train operation (maximum security level for operational aspects) and thus on passengers safety (maximum security level for safety). This also lead to severe financial impacts for the train operator, but railway sector in general. The OOS domain CCTV surveillance system is responsible for managing surveillance sources, collecting surveillance information, analyzing surveillance functions, displaying surveillance information (selected, or triggered by alarm source) and recording surveillance information. The OOS domain CCTV does not cover CCTV for rear view. A threat analysis of the CCTV surveillance system is presented in Table II . As shown in this analysis, threats on OOS CCTV affect the system integrity and availability but also customers confidentiality since sensitive data about particular passengers or particular shipped goods and their location in the train may be shared with unauthorized entities. Attacking the CCTV system may be a step before bigger attacks on the train (such as criminal or terrorist attacks). For that, attacking the CCTV system may severely affect the passengers and the vehicle safety although it does not directly affect train operations.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we performed security threats and vulnerabilities assessments for TCMS. We also presented some results from the detailed threat analysis. This work was conducted as a part of the Roll Rail project. It presents the first step in a selected methodology to establish a cyber-physical secure TCMS. Throughout this analysis, we deduced that the absolute majority of threats targets mainly integrity and availability of TCMS services. The violation of these security properties by attacks against many train subsystems and especially against communication services can lead to the most severe consequences or even catastrophic ones. Regarding data confidentiality, it is to be considered only for the COS domain functionalities and the OOS domain CCTV. Further, we will continue the security risk assessment process. As such, a detailed risk assessment will be elaborated to evaluate the criticality of the identified threats on railway systems, and to help suggesting more efficient countermeasures for securing TCMS.
[ ] R R-WP . The network is disconnected, no data exchange between propulsion system components. The propulsion system is not able to take the right decision. The driver can not control the propulsion system. For safety reasons, the train performs a controlled emergency break. Using the identity, the attacker has advanced privileges, and thus can manipulate the system. The attacker makes the train travel to an unauthorized speed, or stops the propulsion system from working. The attacker can manipulate propulsion system and create new entry point to conduct more attacks.
Massive damage to safety and security related functions can be made. Danger for passengers and vehicle. 
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